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The Missing Links in Tax Reform
Edward J. McCaffery*
A funny thing happened on the way to fundamental tax re-
form: Nothing. Just a few short years ago, it looked as if we might
have another great American tax revolt, akin to the one that
started this country over 200 years ago. Ronald Reagan had got-
ten the modern bandwagon started, first in California in the 1970s
and later, from the White House, in the 1980s. 1 Politicians-like
football coaches, investment advisors, and most of the rest of us-
are apt to keep trying the same old thing until it has proven be-
yond a shadow of a doubt to work no longer. Thus the antitax talk
continued full force into the 1990s.
George Bush's quivering lips probably cost him the 1992 pres-
idential election, and only further proved how deadly serious anti-
tax talk had become.2 The Contract with America, which fueled
the sweeping Republican electoral victories in the mid-term elec-
tions of 1994, was full of fire and brimstone talk of tax. Steve
Forbes nearly made the 1996 presidential election a referendum
on the flat tax, even as Jack Kemp was more effective at person-
ally cashing in on the idea.4 The fire still burned bright after Bill
* Maurice Jones Jr. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School
and Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology. An ear-
lier version of this paper was presented at the "Federal Tax Policy in the New Millennium,"
The Second Annual Tax Law Institute, Chapman University School of Law. I thank the
Institute's organizers and participants for their help and comments. I also thank Christo-
pher Suh for excellent research assistance.
1 See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, REAGAN's AMERICA (1987); Kenneth Cooper, GOP Offers a
"Contract" to Revive Reagan Years, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1994, at Al. Of course, Reagan
stood in a long line of American tax cutters, haters, and protesters. See generally CHARLES
ADAMS, THOSE DIRTY ROTTEN TAXES (1998) (chronicling history of taxes and tax protests in
America).
2 See Alan Murray & Jackie Calmes, The Great Debate: How the Democrats, with
Real Cunning, Won the Budget War, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at Al; John E. Yang, Budget
Deal Appears at Hand, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al; Thomas Patterson, Bad News,
Bad Governance, 546 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 97, 104 (1996).
3 See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK
ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillepsie & Bob Schellas
eds., 1994) [hereinafter CONTRACT]. See also CONTRACT WITH THE AMERICAN FAMILY: A
BOLD PLAN BY CHRISTIAN COALITION TO STRENGTHEN THE FAMILY AND RESTORE COMMON-
SENSE VALUES (1995) [hereinafter CONTRACT II]. I discuss the two Contracts and their talk
of tax in Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 128-37 (1996). See also
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 202-25 (1997).
4 See Jackie Calmes, Forbes's Flat-Tax Plan Will Be a Tough Sell, WALL ST. J., Feb.
5, 1996, at Al; Jack Kemp, Lower Taxes, Higher Revenues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, § 4,
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Clinton had defeated Bob Dole-perhaps the only major Republi-
can candidate without a radical tax overhaul plan.' By 1997, Rep-
resentatives Dick Armey and Billy Tauzin were touring the
country putting on a "Scrap the Tax Code Tour," a kind of Lincoln-
Douglas debate for the 1990s, with taxes replacing slavery as the
topic du jour.6 Calls for a national sales or value-added tax to re-
place the income tax gained steam. Republicans took to calling
the gift and estate tax the "death tax" and made popular, if not
quite populist, calls for its repeal.7 The "marriage tax" became a
front page issue in major newspapers, and Congress was full of
proposals to kill it.' In a kind of crowning glory to all this talk of
tax, Republicans initiated the Tax Code Termination Act, calling
for the utter abolition of the income tax as we have come to know
it by the dawn of the next millennium.'
But, lo and behold, actual tax policy and legislation of the
1990s has looked suspiciously like its predecessors in, say, the
1960s or 1970s-lacking even the radicalness of Ronald Reagan's
1980s. The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993,10 the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,11 and the IRS Restructuring and Re-
form Act of 1998,12 to name three quick examples, all featured typ-
ically ad hoc and incremental changes: tinkering among the deck
chairs of the Titanic. Among the key provisions of these laws were
a nonrefundable $500 per child credit, an expansion of the earned-
income tax credit, the creation of new individual retirement ac-
counts (IRAs), reductions in the capital gains rates, and an in-
crease in the unified credit under the estate and gift tax. These
changes are hardly the stuff of revolution.
at 15; Rob Norton, The Wrong Way to Sell a New Idea: The Flat Tax Has Emerged as the
Single Biggest Issue in the 1996 Presidential Race. Can It Succeed in Spite of its Support-
ers?, FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 1996, at 41.
5 See Thomas Powers, The Last Hurrah, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 15, 1996, at 3
(discussing Dole and his positions on tax reform); Dole Calls for "Flat" Tax Rate, N.Y.
TimEs, Jul. 5, 1982, at A17; Lawrence Kudlow, Cut Taxes, Starve the Beast, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 30, 1996, at A18; Marvin Chirelstein, Taxes and Public Understanding, 29 CONN. L.
REv. 9, 14 (1996).
6 See Agnes Roletti, Republicans Urging Radical Change in IRS Cheered Here, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 22, 1998, at B1.
7 See Greg Hitt, GOP Targets Estate Taxes, Capital Gains, WALL ST. J., June 10,
1997, at A3; Estate Tax Elimination: A Family Relief Act (Editorial), ARIZONA REP., Sept.
11, 1998, at B6. See also Joel Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35
SYRAcusE L. REV. 1215, 1225 (1985).
s See, e.g., Janet Hook, Appeal Grows for Bid to End "Marriage Tax," L.A. TIMEs, Oct.
20, 1997, at Al. The so-called marriage tax was a major theme in MCCAFFERY, TAXING
WOMEN, supra note 3.
9 See Grandstanding on Taxes, N.Y. TiMEs, June 24, 1998, at A24 (editorial).
lo Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
11 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
12 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685
(1998).
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So much sound and fury thus signified so much nothing.
Even as a large federal surplus made the kind of radical reform
called for in the early part of the decade-and called irresponsible
by liberals-possible, Democrats, led by President Clinton, contin-
ued to advocate a panoply of small ad hoc changes, while even
Republicans seemed to be abandoning the radical tax reform
ship.13 What happened?
In this essay I want to answer that question by looking at
three related missing links in tax reform: the people, principle,
and policy. First, however, let us take a deeper look at the rheto-
ric and reality of tax today.
I. THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF REFORM
This Part summarizes the dominant themes in the tax de-
bates over the last quarter-century, and then looks at actual tax
reform in the 1990s. It concludes by looking at some structural
reasons why the reality of tax reform has not lived up to the fiery
promise of its rhetoric.
A. Talk of Tax
The modern antitax movement can usefully, if a bit simplisti-
cally, be laid at the feet of Ronald Reagan. Reagan's America fea-
tured a vision of a downsized government off of the people's backs,
taxing and doing less. Reagan participated in the great tax-limi-
tation movements in California in the 1970s, 4 and he rode this
antitax rhetoric into the White House.
Reagan delivered, partially. The two great tax acts of his
presidency, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) 5 and
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986),16 certainly changed the
face of the Internal Revenue Code. The highest marginal tax rate
when Reagan took office was 70%, as it had been ever since the
Kennedy administration. 7 ERTA lowered this to 50%, and the
TRA 1986 brought it down further, to 28% or 33%, depending on
how one considers the notorious "bubble."' The 1986 Act also
eliminated any preference for capital gains, and, notwithstanding
13 See State of the Union: Clinton Outlines His Vision for Nation's Transition to the
21st Century, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 20, 1999, at A22; Eric Pianin and Ferge Hager, With Black
Ink, Clinton Draws a Line, WASH. POST., Jan. 21, 1999, at 6; Clinton, Republicans Each
Pitch Own Tax, Budget Plans, L.A. Tmms, Jan. 24, 1999, at A16.
14 See David Kyrig, Refining or Resisting Modern Government? The Balanced Budget
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 28 AKRON L. REV. 97, 105 (1995). See also WILLS,
supra note 1.
15 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
16 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
17 I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1976) (amended 1981).
IS See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861, 1989-
99 (1994).
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bickering among many practitioners and academics, fairly signifi-
cantly simplified the Code. 19 Among other things, by raising the
standard exemption levels and by indexing the marginal rate
brackets for inflation, TRA 1986 got millions of lower and lower-
middle income Americans off the tax rolls to stay.20 By any mea-
sure, this was radical tax reform.
Of course, as we well know by now, these tax reductions only
captured part of the story. Under Reagan there was in fact, a
large shift to payroll and corporate taxes, while the total tax bur-
den stayed more or less the same. Giving credit where credit is
due, however, we can at least see the 1980s as a time of significant
tax reform.
Tax reform rhetoric continued full force into the 1990s. In-
deed, picking up on the success of Reagan, the rhetoric intensified.
The Contract with America illustrates this trend well. This
skilled political tract ingeniously mixed antigovernment, antitax,
and pro-family talk. The Contract called for a reduction in the
capital gains rate and a $500 per child credit, an idea that had
originated with the Christian Coalition as an infra-marginal way
to get tax relief to all families, without altering the disincentives
facing working wives in two-earner ones.2' These technical provi-
sions were part of a bigger agenda. The Contract made clear
throughout, with its calls for term limits, supra-majority voting
requirements, and a line-item veto, that none other than the fed-
eral government, now seen as the arch-enemy to family values,
was its prey." Tax had become the government's life-blood; any
blow against taxes was a blow against the beast itself. Tax reduc-
tion, government downsizing, and morality were all, in the end,
one and the same thing.
Going beyond the Contract, which perhaps hinged too nar-
rowly on its social conservative underpinnings, talk of tax reform
continued to expand and become more specific while retaining its
radical taint. In the late 1990s, we have witnessed attacks on the
income tax, the "marriage tax," and the "death tax."2' Advocates
of fundamental reform have been recommending a flat tax, na-
tional sales tax, VAT tax, MAX tax, just about any tax but what
we now have.24 A defining moment in this antitax fever was the
19 See id. at 1920-23, and sources cited therein.
20 See Marjorie Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 159 (1993); McCaffery, supra note 18, at
1894.
21 See MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN. supra note 3.
22 See CONTRACT, supra note 3.
23 See William Gale, Tax Reform in the Real World, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 387 (1998)
(book review).
24 See Alan Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value
Added Tax, Retail Sales Tax and USA Tax Into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281,
1283 (1996).
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proposal of the Tax Code Termination Act to eliminate the Inter-
nal Revenue Code as we have come to know it as of the dawn of
the millennium.25
B. The Facts of Tax in the 1990s
With so much talk of tax, one would think that something was
in fact being done. Since the monumental TRA 1986, however, tax
legislation has been characterized by ad hoc tinkering within the
basic confines of an income-plus-estate tax. Consider, for exam-
ple, the principal provisions of three major pieces of 1990s tax
legislation.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 raised margi-
nal rates a bit, reopened the preference for capital gains that TRA
1986 had briefly shut down, expanded the earned-income tax
credit, increased the income taxation of social security benefits,
and limited the corporate tax deduction for executive pay."
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 primarily accepted the prin-
cipal recommendations of the Contract by further lowering the tax
rates on capital gains and adding a $500 per child credit. It went
on to essentially eliminate the taxation of gain on the sale of per-
sonal residences, increase the unified credit under the gift and es-
tate tax to $1,000,000 over time, add a bonus for qualified family-
owned businesses under the estate tax, modify the treatment of
IRAs, and continue a Clinton-era theme of creating special sav-
ings provisions for health and education."
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 added scores
of relatively minor substantive provisions to its principal themes,
which were the administrative overhaul of the IRS and revisions
to the procedures for the collection and enforcement of taxes.
Among these changes were additional lowering of the capital
gains rates and more tinkering with IRAs and savings accounts.28
All of these changes did not add up to very much. There was
no major change to the structure of the income or "death" taxes,
nor was a death blow dealt to the marriage tax. No steps were
taken in the direction of simplification. Within days of its pas-
sage, for example, the Taxpayer Relief Act was being dubbed the
Tax Preparer's Relief Act. 9 The 1998 law may only have been
worse. As the millennium drew to a close, politicians showed
every sign of continued tinkering to come. The more things failed
to change, the more they stayed the same.
25 See supra note 9.
26 See supra note 10.
27 See supra note 11.
28 See supra note 12.
29 See, e.g., Jacqueline Albus, Comment: The Deduction for Interest on Student Loans:
Relief is on the Way, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 591, 610 (1998).
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C. Barriers to Reform: The Tyranny of the Practical
Why has so little been done? There are several deep-seated
structural barriers to real reform, rooted in both our politics and
in our habits of heart and mind. Fundamental change in a system
as large, coercive, and important as tax requires the support of the
people, which in turn requires the articulation of simple, consis-
tent principles as guides to tax reform. President Reagan was
able to use both simplification and an assault on the absurdly high
marginal tax rates under the income tax as his principal tools for
galvanizing public opinion. Since Reagan, the Great Communica-
tor, we have lacked an articulate and popularly accessible sense of
where to go with tax reform. Everybody hates the status quo, it
seems, but it is hard to build a positive agenda on negative senti-
ment alone. Absent some general consensus on the ideal, actual
tax reform has fallen prey to what I have called the "tyranny of
the practical."30 Consider three related aspects of this.
First, tax policy, as Michael Graetz among others has pointed
out,31 seems to have become enslaved to the lure of distributive
tables. Policymakers in Washington prepare charts of "winners"
and "losers" from any proposed tax reform. This characterization
has a quite specific meaning. "Winners" are those whose taxes
will go down under a proposed change, ceteris paribus, and
"losers" are those whose taxes will go up. The distributive tables
get picked up in the popular press and consciousness. They then
stand as an obstacle to further dialogue or ultimate change. Once
one has seen oneself stamped as a "loser," typically on the front
page of the local newspaper, it is hard to get enthusiastically on
board behind any particular tax reform. Nobody likes to lose-
most especially not money.
There are some unfortunate things about this political and in-
tellectual habit. Consequences matter, of course, and distribution
is one of the most important elements of tax policy. There is, for
example, very good reason to believe that the flat tax is unattrac-
tive on the grounds of traditional liberal theories of distributive
justice and in the popular consciousness. Reformers should listen
to both dimensions of the case against this idea. There is no rea-
son that the upper class should be the systematic "winner," and
the middle class the systematic "loser," under fundamental tax re-
form. The distributive tables, painted in big broad strokes, are
often telling us something important.
The questions of the distributive tables, however, are not all
that there is to the case for tax reform. There are also problems of
30 See McCaffery, Tax's Empire, supra note 3, at 90-91.
31 See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609
(1995).
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measurement, such as whether or not one uses "dynamic" or
"static" "scoring,"32 but this really is the least of it. Our current
tax system is very badly flawed-it is in many ways immoral-
and yet we seem stuck in it, forever, because we are blinded by a
narrow vision of dollars and cents. The distributive tables and the
attendant focus on winners and losers lead us away from focusing
on the bigger picture of the ideal shape of our tax system.
An alternative way to proceed would be to put the numbers
aside and get the principles down right first. After all, questions
of a tax's base, the "what" of taxation, are logically distinct from
questions of the tax's rate structure, or the "how much" question.
We can and should decide on the broad structure of the tax system
first, and then design a rate structure such that we can all live
with the "winners" and "losers" produced by the ensuing distribu-
tive tables. In plain terms, the tail shouldn't be wagging the dog.
Second, there has been, at times, an excessive focus on the
problems of transition.3 Once an idea for fundamental reform is
floated, however tentatively, think-tanks and academics produce
detailed analyses of all the headaches involved in getting from
here to there. This focus on the downside of reform buttresses our
natural aversion to change of any sort, and seems to consign us,
forever, to the status quo. Of course change is hard. Taxes are a
big part of our lives, and so changing the tax system will, no
doubt, pose many difficulties, both seen and unseen. This anxiety
about change is part of the reason why old taxes are good taxes, by
and large, all things being equal. 4
But all things are not equal. Things are very bad indeed. I
don't think our current, complex, hybrid tax system scores partic-
ularly well on any criteria of sensible tax policy: equity, efficiency,
or administrability.3 It is a fairly simple matter for the wealthy
and well-advised property-owning class to avoid paying taxes al-
32 See, e.g., id. at 668-72.
33 An excellent general discussion of various tax systems and the problems of transi-
tion in getting to them can be found in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS, CHANGING AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE (1996) [hereinafter
AICPA]. See also JOEL SLFMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM (1996). For a classic statement of problems in mak-
ing the transition to a consumption tax, see Michael J. Graetz, Implementing A Progressive
Consumption Tax, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1575 (1979).
34 The saying that "old taxes are good taxes," or the variant that "the only good tax is
an old tax," is generally attributed to Adam Smith. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru
Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and
Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1157 n.7 (1989); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 873 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) (new taxes meet opposi-
tion from the populace).
35 See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy under a Hybrid Income-Consump-
tion Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992) [hereinafter Hybrid]. I return to and expand on this
theme in my current book project, EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, THE NEXT GREAT AMERICAN TAX
REVOLT (forthcoming 2000-manuscript on file with Chapman Law Review).
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together, on both first- and later-generation wealth. 6 Meanwhile,
the middle and lower-middle classes are hit hard by what is in-
creasingly a wage tax system, looking at both the "income" tax per
se, and the large and important payroll tax system. Two-earner
families, and especially the working mothers within them, are
hard hit,37 and other problems of justice and fairness abound.
When we look at the current tax system from the standpoint of
principle, almost anything seems better-no matter how hard and
long the route from here to there might be.
We ought not to let practical details preclude better theoreti-
cal thinking. Without first focusing on some attractive light at the
end of the tunnel, we may never start the journey toward tax re-
form. The tail is now wagging the dog to sleep.
Third, aside from the general habits of mind that have us
looking to distributive tables and questions of transition as ways
of cutting off the revolution at its roots, there are a host of more
particular reasons-political, intellectual, psychological-that
keep us wedded to the way things are. Consider, for one very
large example, how our practical bipartisan politics have played
out-a story that might be most simply described as "Gridlock
Happens."
Republicans, starting with Ronald Reagan, got on the antitax
bandwagon and found it to be wildly successful, but they also
loaded up this wagon with a good deal of baggage. Tax reform in
the hands of Republicans has been linked throughout to the logi-
cally independent case against government itself or has been used
in the service of supporting a narrow, socially conservative, "fam-
ily values" agenda.3" Republicans married what I take to be, and
what I shall argue below to be, a sensible policy answer to the
question of the ideal tax base, or the "what" of taxes-the case for
consumption taxes-to a position on the appropriate rate struc-
ture, or the "how much" question. As others at this Symposium
have discussed, we now have a plethora of flat-tax consumption
plans floating about,39 but there is no reason sounding in logic,
policy, or principle why consumption taxes need be "flat."
36 See McCAFFERY, THE NExr GREAT AMERicAN TAX REVOLT, supra note 35.
37 See McCAFFERY, TAXiNG WOMEN, supra note 3.
38 See generally CONTRACT, supra note 3; CONTRACT H, supra note 3; both discussed in
McCaffery, Tax's Empire, supra note 3. See also Christine Klein, A Requiem for the Rol-
lover Rule: Capital Gains, Farmland Loss, and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 409 (1998).
39 Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate and
Base, 2 CHP. L. REV. 197 (1999); Alan Schenk, Radical Tax Reform in the 21st Century:
The Role for a Consumption Tax, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 133 (1999); Barbara H. Fried, The Puz-
zling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157 (1999). See also AICPA, supra
note 33 and SLEMROD & BAKmiA, supra note 33.
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Democrats, meanwhile, ever distrustful of Republicans, paid
little or no attention to tax. They confused the preferred Republi-
can endpoint of smaller, less redistributive taxes and spending
programs with one of its institutional means, tax reform. Presi-
dent Clinton seems to have grown especially fond of small,
targeted, nonrefundable tax credits.40 Looked at closely, this pre-
dilection, like the fondness for substantive positions such as the
one favoring school uniforms, consists more of rhetoric than real-
ity. The nonrefundable nature of the credits means that they can-
not possibly benefit the 40% or so of adult Americans too poor to
pay positive income tax, while their various caps and ceilings en-
sure that they cannot benefit the wealthiest Americans who are
most likely to act on tax law incentives.4' We are left with small,
technical provisions that cost little and sound nice-serving wor-
thy goals such as helping adoptive families or the disabled-but
that do next to nothing.
In this climate, no one is advocating what is an obvious, sensi-
ble compromise. We should concede the base issue to the Republi-
cans and the rate issue to the Democrats. This compromise would
leave us with a progressive consumption-without-estate tax, a sys-
tem with attractive normative properties that seems to resonate
well with contemporary democratic values.42 Yet, except for the
brief moment that the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax had in the sun,
no one has worked very hard to advance this sensible idea.43
II. THE MISSING LINKS
Rhetoric has left us with the same old dreary reality. What is
to be done? In this part, I cash in on the promise of this essay's
title and discuss the missing links in tax reform.
A. The People
Missing link number one is the people. The American tax sys-
tem is big, coercive, and important; nearly $3 trillion, roughly one-
third of our gross domestic product, gets churned through the tax
40 See, e.g., Heidi Glenn & Daniel Tyson, Clinton Throws Out First Tax Cut Chip, 82
TAX NOTES 159 (1999). See generally AMITy SHLAES, THE GREEDY HAND: How TAXES DRIVE
AMERICANS CRAzY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (1999).
41 See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, The Downside of a Tax Credit for Caregivers, WASH.
POST., Jan. 24, 1999, at H2. See also McCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 3, at 148-49.
42 I develop these arguments further in Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994) [hereinafter Uneasy Case]; Edward J.
McCaffery, The Political Liberal Case against the Estate Tax, 23 PHILOS. & PUB. AFF. 281
(1994); Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to Critics), 51 TAX L. REV.
615 (1996); and McCaffery, Tax's Empire, supra note 3.
43 See generally LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX: A PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION
TAX (1997).
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system each year." It is simply unthinkable that we could change
such a massive and massively important system without popular
support, input, and understanding. Tax stands at the center of
our practical political lives. It often dominates our presidential
politics. The people care, passionately, about tax, yet we have
very little public understanding of the real facts and possibilities
of tax, and very few attempts to get more.
The people themselves can hardly be blamed fully for this
sorry state of affairs. Tax is complex and it hits close to the bone.
Modern life is complicated enough without expecting people to ed-
ucate themselves in the nuances of public finance and policy alter-
natives. The passions of tax make it even harder to think clearly
about it. 4 A further problem is that the people are not getting any
help in their obvious hunger to replace the current disaster of a
tax system with something more sensible, efficient, and fair.
One set of culprits is the politicos, the "inside the beltway"
crowd, who have proven time and time again to be out of step with
the American people, most recently in the extended saga of Presi-
dent Clinton's impeachment. 46 Insiders talk of tax in terms of "dy-
namic scoring" and narrow pragmatics. Talk of tax, as we have
seen above, gets wrapped up and lost in other agendas, such as
the Republicans' for downsizing government or the Democrats' for
preserving spending programs. There is even reason to be cynical
about the ultimate political will to change tax. A certain sociologi-
cal tendency of bureaucracy makes tax, an already complicated
subject, more and more distant from the language and concerns of
everyday people.47 At the same time, the fact that the taxing
power and the threat of its exercise provides a major impetus be-
hind campaign contributions leads one to doubt how much Wash-
ington insiders genuinely desire any radical change.4 A similar
pattern of heated rhetoric followed by icy inaction has character-
ized one of the other great areas of modern inertia: campaign fi-
44 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1998, at 307 tbl.499, 456 tbl.721 (118th ed. 1998).
45 Consider for example Hume's observation: "As violent passion hinders men from
seeing directly the interest they have in equitable behavior towards others; so it hinders
them from seeing that equity itself, and gives them a remarkable partiality in their own
favours." DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 538 (Lewis A. Selby-Bigge & P.H.
Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (1740).
46 See Howard Kurtz, Americans Wait for the Punch Line on Impeachment as the Sen-
ate Trial Proceeds, Comedians Deliver the News, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at Al.
47 See, e.g., Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity:
Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAw. 9 (1982).
48 See generally Richard L. Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing
Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987); Richard L.
Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of
Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987) (both articles suggesting and amply demonstrat-
ing that campaign contributions drive tax lawmaking and reform).
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nance reform.49 Tax as usual is part of business as usual. Those
who are in power have won under the rules, and seem hesitant to
change them.
In this climate, the academy, including lawyers, accountants,
and economists, has only proven to be a second culprit. Scholars
who have the time and talent to understand this kind of thing
could be helping to reach out to the people, to speak of tax and tax
reform in plain terms. Trapped in narrow debates among them-
selves, however, and concerned about appearing too "popular" or
"political," the academy has been turning inward, not reaching
outward.50 Although the situation has been changing of late, with
symposia such as this one being an important example of a new
promise, too much tax scholarship is still too devoted to the con-
cerns of too few people.
All of this is unfortunate, for the people seem clearly ready
and willing to change-if they can be helped to see a way. Look-
ing at general attitudes, we see that the current tax system is
widely disdained. If this anger against the status quo can be
translated into a popular and understandable program, then the
people can get behind tax reform. We need them.
B. Principle
Missing link number two is principle. I mean "principle" in a
rather precise sense, picking up on the jurisprudential ideas of
Ronald Dworkin. 5' Dworkin distinguishes between concerns of
"policy," where matters can be left to a net balancing of social in-
terests-he cites as an example the decision to pursue some pro-
ject in national defense, or questions about which military bases
to close-and concerns of "principle," where questions of right,
fairness, and justice trump any narrowly framed calculus of indi-
49 For the interesting idea that Congress often tries to delay in order to do nothing-to
'strike while the iron is cold"-see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of
Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEG. STU=. 747 (1990).
50 A somewhat contrary tendency has appeared in a new movement of tax scholarship,
to which I have often been linked, loosely called "critical tax theory." To the extent that
adherents of this self-identified movement take a critical questioning and normative stance
in relation to tax law, doctrine, and policy, I think that the movement is salutary and long
overdue. At times, however, perhaps inevitably, critical tax theorists have also turned in-
ward and been as trapped within their own intellectual debates as the older generation of
tax law scholars of whom they are often critical. Critical tax theory itself has also become
bogged down in a debate over its meanings and possibilities. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak,
Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1521 (1998) and the several re-
sponses to it in the same issue. For the record, I tend to think that such academic pursuits
are important and valuable, but that tax also needs for scholars to reach out and explain
things better to the people affected by it all.
51 RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
(1985). See also Edward J. McCaffery, Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1043
(1997); Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REv. 739, 745
(1997).
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vidual interests.52 "Equality" is a principle, for example, and
when it is seen to come into play, its dictates must be followed.
Thus, in an example that I think should strike home for tax re-
formers today, the right to equal concern and respect, to equal op-
portunity, that propelled the Supreme Court to overrule the
"separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson3 in Brown v. Board
of Education,54 was a matter of principle. The fact that the transi-
tion to desegregated schools was difficult and costly, as well as the
fact that this change no doubt had its "losers," did not count as
arguments against the principle. Rights "trump" interests, nar-
rowly conceived.
Now clearly tax is quite often a matter of policy-of horse
trades and dollars and cents. But it is more than that. The failure
to articulate a domain of principle for tax underlies and informs
the current gap between rhetoric and reality. Narrow questions of
distribution and transition are indeed fair game, and can often be
decisive, in a narrowly policy regime, but a huge and coercive sys-
tem like tax cries out for something else, and more. Democratic
legitimacy demands that the state's exercise of coercive power
through its tax system be principled. Tax matters.
There are two connected reasons for this commitment to prin-
ciple in tax. First, there is a principle behind the need for princi-
ple. Tax is large and coercive and it affects far-reaching aspects of
our social lives: the kinds of people we are and might reasonably
hope to become, to paraphrase John Rawls.55 It is a fundamental
part of a reasonable conception of democratic legitimacy, that
power be exercised with principle.
Second, just as there is a principle of requiring principle, the
case for more principle in tax draws support from pragmatic poli-
tics. In short, principle sells. There is nothing bad or disingenu-
ous about this truth. The people cannot understand intricate
debates about tax, but they can understand the core principles
and commitments of alternative tax regimes. We ought to have
that out, to get a chance to arrive at principles that can serve as
going-forward guides to debate and reform.
We can understand these abstractions with reference to con-
temporary practice. The current income-plus-estate tax system
rests on a principle that tax burdens should be borne according to
one's "ability to pay."56 This principle suggests an income tax,
52 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, ch. 2 (1977).
53 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
54 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55 See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980);
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 269-71 (1993 & 1996).
56 For a seminal statement of the "ability to pay" norm, see Richard Musgrave, In
Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. REv. 44, 45-46 (1967).
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which differs from a consumption tax only in its inclusion of sav-
ings within the base." Since savings add to a taxpayer's ability to
pay, traditional tax theorists insist on including them within the
tax base.
As an a priori matter, "ability to pay" is a perfectly compelling
principle. The problem-and it is a factual problem-is that
nearly a century of experience has taught us that American soci-
ety is not committed to taxing savings. Thus, we have the realiza-
tion requirement, supplemented with the nontaxation of most
retirement savings, insurance, home equity, and human capital. 8
The practical and political inability consistently to tax the yield to
capital has left us with a hybrid income-consumption tax that is
badly flawed in practice and altogether ungrounded in theory. As
a practical matter, the current hybrid tax is no tax at all for the
rich and well-advised, especially if they presently have capital and
an inclination to spend it all on themselves. That situation is a
disgrace, or it ought to be, and it leaves us with no compelling
principle to take to the people in arguing for any particular tax
reform.
C. Policy
Missing link number three is policy, in a specific, practical
sense. The previous section argued that the people cannot get in-
volved in practical tax reform politics without some coherent prin-
ciple that they can understand and endorse. We need principle.
At the same time, however, principle needs policy-in the con-
crete, particular sense of a specific plan or proposal to carry and
illustrate it. Abstractions only go so far in America. "Equality,"
for example, has long been a widely accepted principle, but the
case of Brown v. Board of Education was necessary to suggest that
the principle required desegregation of public schools.
In the case of tax, this all might seem hopeless. There is so
much talk of tax and so little agreement. Where are the common
principles, other than that everyone wants to tax someone else?
There seems to be neither principle nor policy to cling to in tax.
Fortunately, however, it all comes together when we step back a
bit and take a calm, dispassionate look at the current lay of the
land.
Let's start with two simple facts of tax logic. One, as I have
mentioned above, is the recognition that questions of a tax's base
are logically separate from questions about its rates. We can talk
57 See generally Hybrid, supra note 35.
58 I discuss these deviations from an income concept in Hybrid, id., and I return to
them in chapter 4 of McCAFFERY, THE NExT GREAT AMERIcAN TAX REVOLT, supra note 35.
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about them separately. Let's put the more contentious rate issue
aside, and focus on the base.
Two, in understanding the tax base, we have the familiar
Haig-Simons definition of income to guide us. In simplified terms,
this definition states that:
Income = Consumption + Savings,59
which tells us no more and no less than that all money is either
spent or not.
Nonetheless, we can rearrange the Haig-Simons definition to
see the very important point that, since
Consumption = Income - Savings,
a consumption tax is any tax that does not tax savings.6 0
These simple insights allow us to see the practical missing
link in talk of tax today. Briefly and simply put:
It's Consumption, Stupid.
It turns out, on closer inspection, that all popular reform propos-
als feature some variant of a consumption tax. This is true of the
national sales tax, the VAT tax, all popular proposals for "flat"
taxes, and the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax.6 ' Even more striking,
the theme of consumption taxation is present in almost all "in-
come" tax reform in the 1990s. Movements to lower the tax rate
on capital gains, exempt the gain from the sale of homes from tax,
and expand IRAs or other savings account vehicles are all the stuff
of consumption taxation, because they retreat from an income
tax's theoretical commitment to taxing savings. Our so-called in-
come tax is already well on its way towards being a "consumption"
tax in fact, and it is getting closer and closer with each and every
major act of tax legislation in the 1990s.12
The movement towards consumption taxation is not just of
practical interest. A consumption tax is appealing to both in-
dependent, abstract, moral and political theory and commonsensi-
59 See generally HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF IN-
COME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY (1938) and HENRY SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM
(1950). See also Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959). See also
Hybrid, supra note 35.
60 See Hybrid, supra note 35; William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974); NICOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX
(1955).
61 See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 24; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 33; AICPA, supra
note 33.
62 See generally Hybrid, supra note 35.
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cal popular morality, because a consumption tax rests on a
principle that we can indeed endorse and take to the people:
We should consistently tax spending, not work or savings.
This simple principle goes a surprisingly long way in crafting
practical tax reform proposals. It not only suggests a more sys-
tematic exemption for savings than our present hybrid income-
consumption tax features, but it also has relevance for such con-
temporary debates as that over "death" taxes. Specifically, the
principle of taxing spending, and spending alone, suggests that we
should indeed abolish the estate and gift tax for one simple rea-
son: Dead men don't spend.
An estate tax falls only on savings, or nonconsumed wealth."
As such, it encourages and rewards consumption; it encourages
the wealthy elderly to spend down their wealth in one grand final
binge, and discourages and penalizes savings, especially, and in-
deed only, long-term, inter-generational savings. It is an anticon-
sumption tax. Further, under the consistent principle of a
consumption tax, no death tax is needed, even in the cause of fair-
ness or justice. A consistent consumption tax can tax the heirs,
when and as they spend the wealth, as current law systematically
fails to do.
The careful reader will have noticed that I have not yet said
anything of substance about the appropriate tax rates. This omis-
sion is by design, following the first fact of tax. The consistent
principle we have thus far developed is about the "what" of taxes.
Now, however, having agreed on a consumption tax base, there
are compelling reasons to advocate maintaining the historic
American commitment to progressive effective tax rates.
Once again looking at the practical proposals-since part of
the idea, after all, is to pay respectful attention to the people'-
all of these turn out not to be "flat" taxes at all, but rather to be
two-rate plans, with some kind of rebate or zero bracket for the
lower income or consumption levels. 5 Under a consistent con-
sumption tax, and under a general tax system now committed to
the principle of being principled, accommodation for the first dol-
lars of a family's spending can be seen to rest on another compel-
ling principle:
Spending on life's necessities should bear a lower rate of tax
than spending on life's ordinary matters.
63 I elaborate on all these arguments at much greater length in Uneasy Case, supra
note 42.
64 This is my central argument in McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be, supra note
42.
65 See Zelenak, supra note 39.
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This same principle can support reasonable exclusions under a
consumption tax base, such as for medical or education expenses.
What we would have, which we now lack, is a consistent principle
against which to measure these "special" provisions.66
Having said that, there is no reason to pull up short and stop
the argument for progression at the lower and middle classes. In
point of fact, the experience of practical politics suggests that
while the flat tax plans are initially attractive, the bloom soon
fades from the rose. 7 Once the distributive tables are trotted out
showing that all popular flat-rate tax plans, which tend to feature
something like a 20% marginal rate, would in fact involve a tax
increase on the middle classes to pay for a tax decrease for the
rich, the appeal of this radical tax plan fades. And why shouldn't
it? What's fair about making the middle classes, who have suf-
fered enough under the current disaster of a tax system, pay a
dollar price for its improvement, while the rich get richer?
Now, once again, we are committed to principle. Stating
these attitudes in principled fashion leads to the following:
Spending on life's luxuries should bear a higher rate of tax than
spending on life's ordinaries, which should bear a higher rate of
tax than spending on life's necessities.
And, voilA, we are done. We have made the case for a progres-
sive consumption-without-estate tax. Note that, just as the con-
sumption and anti-estate tax elements were grounded in both
current popular democratic norms and some sense of ideal polit-
ical theory, so too with the progressive element. Americans have
consistently shown support for at least moderate progressivity in
the tax system .6  This arrangement strikes us as fair; liberal
political theory supports it; and we can see it in the current polit-
ical winds, most importantly in the ultimate disillusionment with
the flat tax.
D. A Modest Proposal
We have developed important governing principles for tax,
looking both to popular attitudes and moral theory. All that re-
mains to be done is to wrap these principles into a coherent policy
proposal, one that the people can understand and endorse. Then
our missing links will have been supplied.
66 See generally William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARv. L. REV. 309 (1972); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the In-
come Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989).
67 See Zelenak, supra note 39.
68 See Marjorie Kornhauser, supra note 20; Peggy A. Hite and Michael L. Roberts, An
Experimental Investigation of Taxpayer Judgments on Rate Structure in the Individual In-
come Tax System, 13 J. Am. TAx. AsS'N 47 (1991).
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It is not all that difficult to implement our principles. Practi-
cal proposals exist, such as the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax Plan, 9
which get pretty close to doing just that. Starting with current
law, we would have to take just three or four basic steps:
(1) allow unlimited IRAs or other savings accounts;
(2) repeal the gift and estate tax and allow IRAs or other tax-
free savings accounts to be transferred with zero basis;70
(3) include debt in the tax base, to prevent arbitrage; 7' and,
(4) if we wanted to, we could even raise the progressive margi-
nal rates at the high end, so that we would have, in essence,
a general luxury tax in place.
What is most important about this modest proposal is that
principle has been its guide. Officials must make reforms with
core commonsensical beliefs in mind. This would help us to have a
tax system open to public scrutiny and accountability-properties
highly and independently attractive to ideal political theory.
To keep the conversation going, consider some simplifying
moves. Imagine this. We put in place a national sales tax at, say,
a 15% rate. There are technical reasons to prefer a value-added
tax to a literal sales one, but this comes out to much the same
place for our purposes.
To create a "zero bracket," we give a rebate to consumers, say
for spending of up to $5000 per person. There are several ways to
do this, including by allowing an exemption from Social Security
contributions. Although the typical American family of four would
pay $3000 in sales taxes on its first $20,000 of consumer
purchases, they would get this money back via the rebate, effec-
tively netting out at a 0% tax rate over this initial range of
spending.
To create a higher bracket for high-end consumption, we next
set up an individual consumption tax, such as the one proposed by
then-Senators Nunn and Domenici in the mid-1990s.7' By al-
lowing unlimited deductions for savings, such a tax isolates out
69 See SEIDMAN, supra note 43; SLEMROD & BAXIJA, supra note 33; AICPA, supra note
33.
70 Note, importantly, that this proposal does not mean that heirs are getting off the
hook. They would pay tax when and as they spent their inheritance, in withdrawing from
the accounts. This situation is as it should be under a consistent consumption tax.
71 See generally Alan J. Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be Limited, in UNEASY
COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX (Henry J. Aaron et. al.
eds., 1988). If this strikes us as too radical-even though a sales tax, the most commonly
understood form of consumption tax, similarly reaches out to include spending out of
debt-we might have an even more systematic interest deduction limitation than current
law now has. I.R.C. § 163 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
72 See generally AICPA, supra note 33, for a discussion of the value added tax versus
sales tax.
73 See generally SEIDMAN, supra note 43.
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consumption. Because everyone would already be paying tax
under the 15% national sales tax, we could have a large exemption
level from this so-called Supplemental Consumption Tax.
Imagine, for example, that we exempted the first $100,000
that a family of four spent. Only those Americans spending more
than this high level need to be concerned with the supplemental
tax. This step would remove tens of millions of Americans from
the annual tax rolls. The supplemental tax could be levied at a
flat rate, again say 15%. Then, spending over $100,000 would
bear the regular 15% sales tax, plus the 15% supplemental tax, for
a combined marginal tax rate of 30%.
Voilb. We are done. We now have a tax system economically
equivalent to a progressive national sales tax, with a rate struc-
ture that looks as follows:
TABLE 1: TAX RATEs UNDER A PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL SALEs TAX
SPENDING TAX RATE
$0 to $20,000 0%
$20,000 to $100,000 15%
over $100,000 30%
The progressive national sales tax would relieve most Ameri-
cans from the burden of filling out annual tax forms. It would sys-
tematically exempt savings from tax, and thus in one stroke
greatly simplify the law. Yet, it would also maintain our historic
commitment to some progression in tax rates and avoid the ab-
surdity of raising taxes on the middle classes to lower them on the
upper classes. We could easily maintain the most popular and im-
portant features of the present tax system, such as home mort-
gage interest deductions, charitable contribution and
extraordinary medical expense deductions, and additional exemp-
tions for children and other personal dependents?4
The call for a progressive national sales tax actually isn't too
crazy. It is similar to proposals independently put forth by former
Representative Sam Gibbons, a Democrat from Florida,75 and Pro-
fessor Michael Graetz of Yale Law School.7" Both Gibbons and
Graetz would have a broad-based national sales or value-added
tax, supplemented with a continuation of the current income tax
74 See I.R.C. §§ 163(h) (home mortgage interest deduction), 170 (charitable contribu-
tion deductions), 213 (extraordinary medical expense deduction), and 151 (personal depen-
dency exemptions) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
75 See H.R. 4050, 104th Cong. (1996).
76 See MICHAEL J. GRAETz, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997).
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for high earners. Because I consider the actual income tax to be a
failure, and the very idea of taxing savings to be misguided, my
proposal instead keeps a consistent focus on consumption. Indeed,
under a progressive national sales tax, we can even eliminate the
gift and estate, or so-called "death," taxes, because a consistent
consumption tax would fall on anyone who spends, parent, child,
or heir, when and as she spends. Under the progressive national
sales tax, there is no need for the costly, confusing, inefficient and
unpopular death tax.
The important thing, however, is not the smallest of specifics.
The devil may be in the details, but we ought, at least, to look for
angels first. The modest proposal is a consistent and progressive
consumption tax, and that's a practical policy proposal that the
American people can understand and endorse. It's also a long way
from where we are today.
III. CONCLUSION: WHERE THERE'S A WAY?
As we stand at the dawn of the millennium, the state of tax is
a state of disgrace. Our major federal tax, the nominal income-
plus-estate tax, is complicated, costly, inefficient, and unfair. The
rich and clever can avoid paying taxes altogether, while the mid-
dle classes continue to toil under what has become, with the in-
creasingly important social security system factored in, an
onerous wage tax system. The people have noticed, and the in-
come tax and its administrators are among the most loathed of our
public institutions. Yet they are also among the most important.
We cannot get around the central fact of modernity that tax is big,
coercive, and wide-ranging in its effects. In short and in sum, tax
stinks. And as long as it does, our great democracy is hindered
from reaching its full potential.
The people's anger alone is not sufficient to effect change.
This is the lesson that the last decade of radical antitax talk has
taught us. The people need some sense of where to go. They need
help in seeing some light-any light-at the end of what might
seem to be more a bottomless pit than a tunnel. If the people are
our first missing link in tax reform, principle is our second, for the
people need some set of ideals to rally around.
Fortunately, with a little bit of intellectual work, it is indeed
possible to discern principles in the cacophony of antitax talk. A
principled reading of democratic values and norms gives us reason
to hope that a progressive consumption tax may one day arrive.
Using what we know and have learned about tax, it is possible to
package these principles in an attractive policy proposal, for what
is, in essence, a progressive national sales tax. Such a plan effects
a Grand Compromise between Republicans calling for a consump-
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tion tax base and Democrats wishing to maintain at least a mod-
erate degree of progressivity in our laws. It is a good, fair,
efficient, and sensible thing to do. With any luck at all, we just
might do it.
Until that day, we can at least aspire to abide by the Hippo-
cratic oath: do no harm. Rather than continue to tinker with our
tax system, we ought to let principle be our guide in the small, as
well as in the large. We should strive in each and every tax act to
get a fairer, simpler, more sensible law, by taking even more sys-
tematic steps in the direction of a consumption tax and maintain-
ing progressive rates on spending, even as we eliminate taxes on
savings altogether. We should keep trying to get lower and mid-
dle-class Americans off the tax rolls, for filling out an annual tax
form has become one of modern life's worst horrors. One day, just
maybe, we will get to a better place in our most important system
of social and economic control. Until that day, let's not make
things worse.
